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Abstract
Currently self-reporting schemes have become an important tool for law enforce-
ment. This thesis analyzes self-reporting under situations where the authority faces
individuals that may not report truthfully. I show that when self-reporters are not
truth tellers deterrence plays an important role to acquire information about the true
value of the harm/crime. Two main conclusions arise. First, when the authority
faces individuals who may partially self-report, the optimal design of self-reporting
programs should include some level of deterrence in order obtain information about
the true harm that has been committed. Second, self-reporting are efficient when
individuals are induced to report truthfully. In particular, social welfare and the
sanction for misreporting have a positive relation when expected damage is high
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1 Introduction
Recently, self-reporting schemes have been introduced in several enforcement schemes
and policies; many laws such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Cor-
porate Leniency Program of the Department of Justice of the United States, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Self Disclosure Policy, etc. re-
quire firms to self-report their compliance or violations to authorities or regulators.
It follows that self-reporting regimes are an issue of policy discussion in many fields
(e.g. environmental damage, tax audit, among others) in the sense that they seem
to provide the stimulus for violators to admit their illegal behaviour if the incentive
to do so is greater than the fine (or other punishment stated by the law) that must
be paid to the government if they were discovered to have issued a false report after
an investigation.
Under these circumstances, according to theory, a self-reporting policy might be
preferred by governments or regulators, because it will directly reduce enforcement
costs and, consequently, increase social welfare due to the fact that governments can
spend resources on other types of productive spending that might benefit society.
In spite of this, some empirical analyses reveal that this is not always the case.
An example of this is found in the empirical assessment of EPA’s Self Disclosure
Policy, which provides a 100 percent reduction in punitive fines when firms disclose
and self-discover their violations. In this assessment, Pfaff and Sanchirico (2004)
find that the self-reported violations under the policy were relatively minor (e.g.
failure to report or wrong inventory of hazardous materials) and not those that can
cause great harm to human health and the environment (e.g. emissions of nox-
ious pollutants). In light of the previous results, it is worth revising the theory of
self-reporting to provide insights for a better policy design that will ensure greater
benefits to society.
Self-reporting was introduced in the literature of enforcement as a to tool to
control for harmful activities when the cost of identifying the responsible parties
of causing that harm was too high (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994). This literature is
based on the work of Becker (1968), who performs an economic analysis to deter-
mine an optimal level of crime and punishment taking into consideration the costs
of enforcement; a variable that was not previously analyzed in the literature about
controlling for activities that cause harm.
In his seminal paper, Becker affirms that the decision making process of poten-
tial violators about committing a damage/crime depend on two main factors i) the
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probability of detection; and ii) the severity of the punishment if they are detected.
Taking deterrence as the objective of the enforcement regime, the model predicts
that this goal could be achieved by either increasing the probability of the detec-
tion (e.g. increasing inspections by the authority) or increasing the penalty (e.g.
increasing the value of a fine).
The issue of self-reporting could be introduced to the literature of enforcement
by modifying the previous assumptions. The key works addressing this issue are
Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Malik (1993), and the central issues addressed by
these papers are: i) when is it efficient for an enforcement regime to rely on self-
reporting by violators?; and ii) what should be the optimal structure of an enforce-
ment regime with self-reporting? (Innes, 1999a).
To answer these questions the mentioned authors attempt to show that in an
enforcement regime it is plausible to provide agents with an economic incentive to
report their violations by proposing a reduced penalty that is equal to or slightly
less than the expected penalty without self-reporting. This allows the authority to
save on enforcement costs because it will only have to inspect non-reporters and
provide, approximately, the same level of deterrence if the reduced penalty is very
close to the value of the expected penalty.
Moreover, both papers also point out some other benefits of self-reporting.
For example, self-reporting may indirectly reduce enforcement costs by reducing
the authority’s reliance on an imperfect auditing technology. Also, as noted by
Kaplow and Shavell (1994) in their seminal paper, self-reporting allows for a given
level of deterrence to be achieved without resorting to the costly use of impris-
onment as punishment. Additionally, they found that self-reporting can improve
risk-sharing by confronting risk-averse violators with a non-stochastic penalty rather
than the stochastic penalty levied on non-reporters (equal to zero when the violator
is not caught and a positive penalty otherwise).
Using the mentioned basic structure, different authors have identified some other
benefits of self-reporting regimes. For example, Innes has several papers on the is-
sue where he argues that self-reporting: i) allows to provide a more targeted deter-
rence when violators hold heterogeneous apprehension probabilities (Innes, 2000);
ii) increases the frequency of remediation/clean up (Innes, 1999a,b) ; and, iii) helps
violators not to engage in costly avoidance activities to prevent apprehension (Innes,
2001).
Another key work which builds upon the Kaplow and Shavell structure is the
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analysis of Livernois and McKenna (1999). They try to find an explanation for
some empirical evidence in which the assumption of the basic model of enforcement,
higher level of expected penalty leads to higher compliance, seems to be violated.
In the same manner as Kaplow and Shavell, they introduce self-reporting into the
standard model of enforcement as a requirement for firms, and let the authority
have enforcement power in the event that false reporting occurs.
Even when results from the previous studies favour self-reporting over non self-
reporting regimes, it is important to notice that they are held by two main assump-
tions. The first one is that the authority can easily separate reporters from the rest
of the population, allowing for just performing inspections over the non-reporting
agents.
The second assumption is that the authority has to commit to inspect those who
do not report even when every violator reports. If the authority decides not to per-
form inspections because she believes that violators will report their harm/crime,
then violators will prefer not to report over reporting their violations, and as a con-
sequence, deterrence will not be achieved.
Particularly, the issue of a lack of commitment to an investigation strategy has
been addressed by the auditing literature. For example, Chatterjee et al. (2008),
based on a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium structure, try to analyze how the absence
of a commitment to an audit policy affects reporting and investigation decisions in
the field of income tax reporting. They assume that the auditor cannot commit to
an auditing strategy in advance, but decides whether to audit or not after observing
the firms’ reports and the information they provide. The main prediction of their
work is that, after choosing the maximally separating equilibrium from a range of
different equilibria (even ones that involve commitment to and audit policy), the
agent is always understating the value of the firm and that this misreporting is
always discovered. This happens because, under the mentioned equilibrium, prob-
abilities are responsive and decreasing in the report.
Khalil and Parigi (1998) studied the issue in the field of risky lending, modeling
a principal-agent relationship in which the borrower has to report his income level
after being provided with a certain amount of money to invest. The borrower bases
his repayment on the income level he reports but the borrower may or may not be-
lieve him and perform an audit to verify the truthfulness of the reported value.
Their set-up predicts that when the lender has no possibility to commit to an audit
strategy the lender must design a contract that provides incentives for the borrower
to repay and for the lender to audit. According to their analysis, a way to design
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this contract is by increasing the loan size in order to convince the borrower that
there is sufficient justification for an audit. Therefore, an increase in the loan size
leads to a decrease in under-reporting.
Specifically in the literature of self-reporting, Gerlach (2013) relaxes the as-
sumption of full commitment to investigate. This work shares with audit literature
the feature that under a situation of lack of commitment to ex-post investigation,
incentives to investigate have to rise endogenously in the equilibrium rather than
exogenously, as in the case of an ex-ante commitment. He argues that, under self-
reporting the authority does cares not only about the reporting strategy but also
about the ex-ante deterrence. In this sense, one of the main conclusions is that
in the presence of lack of commitment to investigate, self-reporting is not always
an efficient mechanism for law- enforcement purposes, because lack of commitment
introduces a negative relationship between the self-reporting rate and, both the
investigation effort and deterrence. Then, if the harm is sufficiently high the au-
thority is always better off not using self-reporting as an enforcement scheme.
Another strong assumption from the standard self-reporting set up is that under
self-reporting schemes, agents report truthfully the harmful act they have commit-
ted 1. This assumption might not always hold. In their paper, Kaplow and Shavell
(1994) argue some possible reasons to explain that situation: i) an optimal mech-
anism might not be in place (i.e. the authority has not chosen the optimal com-
bination of probability of inspection and level of sanction); ii) the agents could
underestimate the probability or magnitude of the sanction or the level of harm of
their actions; and iii) some agents may know that detection is unlikely.
Another reason why individuals might only partially self-report violations is
when the enforcement scheme involves remediation of the damage. It could be the
case, that due to the severity of the harm, the associated remediation costs are suf-
ficiently high. Then, if the probability of being investigated is sufficiently low the
violator will always prefer to report a less severe act than the one he has committed,
because if he is investigated and discovered he will pay the maximal fine plus the
costs of remediation.
Using the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the previous situation is
modeled as a signalling game which also relies on the fact that the authority cannot
commit to an investigation effort ex-ante. Therefore, the strategies of the players
are determined endogenously, in contrast to the standard self-reporting set up.
1Under the optimal scheme Kaplow and Shavell (1994) assume that all the violators report their
harmful act truthfully.
4
This thesis proceeds as follows. The next section describes the proposed model
to analyze partial self-reporting in the presence of remediations costs. Section 3 an-
alyzes the equilibrium when violators are allowed to not report truthfully. Section
4 analyzes the implication of such an equilibrium on social welfare. Section 5 states
the main conclusion of this thesis. All formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
In the proposed game there are two players, an individual (he, I) and an authority
(she, A). The risk neutral individual can cause three levels of damage (d) to society:
no damage (0), low damage (L) and high damage (H), where 0 < L < H. The level
of damage, d, defines the type of individual the authority could face. The proba-
bility of the an individual causing damage is defined by α, and the probability of
causing a high level of damage is h; α and h ∈ [0,1]. Then, the ex-ante probabilities
of causing the three different types of damage are defined by
p(d) =


(1− α) if d = 0,
α(1 − h) if d = L
αh if d = H
.
(1)
In this game “nature” moves first and draws a level of damage (d). The indi-
vidual can observe the level of damage he has committed and issues a report to the
authority, which is denoted as r(d) and is a function that maps from the different
types of individual into the report. It is important to note that r(d) ∈ [0, L,H],
which means that the possible values that the report can take belong to a finite
strategy space. Consequently, when the individual reports he can decide to do it
truthfully or misreport (i.e. he can decide to report the true level of damage or to
report the other two possible values for d.
The authority cannot observe the true value of the damage caused by the indi-
vidual and cannot commit to an investigation effort ex-ante, therefore, she decides
whether to audit or not after observing the information conveyed in the report with
probability a(r) ∈ [0,1]. Auditing will perfectly reveal d and the amount of mis-
reporting. If the audit reveals a misreporting then the individual will have to pay
a sanction F > 0 and repair the damage that he has caused (the true value of d).
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Formally, the expected payoff to the individual when he observes d, reports r and
the probability of auditing is a(r) is
U(r, d) = −a(r)×


(d+ F ) if r $= d
d if r = d
− (1− a(r))× r(d). (2)
From the first term of the previous equation it is possible to observe that when
the individual is audited and he was misreporting he will have to pay the true value
of the damage plus a sanction, but if he is audited and he was reporting truthfully
he will only repair the damage he caused. From the second term of the equation it
is possible to see that when he is not audited he will only pay the amount of damage
that was reported.
Moreover, whenever the authority performs an audit she faces investigation costs
c(a) > 0, which are strictly increasing in the ex-post audit probability, a(r), and
are given by
c(a) =
c× [a(r)]2
2
. (3)
Even when the authority cannot observe the true value of the damage, she knows
the ex-ante probabilities defined in (1) and, therefore, can estimate the expected
level of damage according to her beliefs about the type of individual she is facing
(high damage or low damage type) after observing the report. In particular, the
authority will form her beliefs about the individual’s type using Bayes rule
B(d|r(d)) =
Pr(d)× Pr(r(d)|d)
Pr(r(d))
.
It follows that the expected level of damage is defined by
E[d|r(d)] = B(d = L|r(d))× L+B(d = H|r(d))×H. (4)
The authority’s objective is to maximize the amount of remediated damage and
to minimize the cost of investigation. Particularly, when the marginal cost of in-
vestigation is strictly greater than the expected damage she will not audit (i.e.
a(r) = 0) and when the marginal cost is strictly smaller than the expected damage
she will perform an audit with probability one (i.e. a(r) = 1). When the marginal
cost is equal to the expected damage she will investigate with positive probability
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(i.e. a(r) ∈ (0, 1)).
When maximizing the amount of remediated damage and minimizing investiga-
tion costs the authority aims to maximize social welfare. The first objective follows
from the fact that repairing a crime/harm always makes society better off. The
second objective relies on the logic that avoiding unnecessary investigation costs
can result in other types of public spending that can benefit society. Formally, the
authority’s expected payoff or ex-post welfare function can be defined as follows
W (r, d) = − (1− a(r))× d− c(a). (5)
From equation (5) it is possible to observe that in this setting an audit always
ensures correct remediation of the damage (regardless of the reported value), so
there is no effect on ex-post social welfare. Additionally, the first term represents
the loss that she (and society) will face if she does not perform an audit and the
individual has caused damage. The second term are the investigation costs as de-
fined in (3).
The incentives of this setting can be explained as follows. The individual always
wishes to report the lowest possible value of d until the probability of being audited
is high enough to prevent him from doing so. If a report is audited with high prob-
ability the individual will never choose to report a level of damage other than the
true value. Recall that for authority, the report contains useful information that
she will use to calculate the expected level of damage, as in (4). She will only
perform an audit when the information suggests that the amount of non-reported
damage that will be discovered is sufficiently high to justify the investigation costs.
This set up is formally captured under the equilibrium concept of Sequential
Equilibrium. However, as the equilibrium of this game will not be defined for in-
finite strategy spaces and can be represented as an extensive form game with in-
complete information and observed actions, the concept that will be used is Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium developed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). It is important
to note that, differing from the Chatterjee et al. (2008)et up, this game will not
be restrained to equilibria of pure reporting strategies, meaning that the individual
is able to randomize among the three possible reporting strategies. The mixing
probabilities will be denoted by xdr ∈ [0, 1], where the superscript is true level of
damage (d) and the subscript is the reported level of damage (r). Moreover, in
the presence of mixed reporting strategies, the previous equations will be slightly
modified to capture such effect.
7
Definition 1. A reporting strategy equilibrium of this game consists of an audit
probability, a(r), a mixing probability, xdr ,a reporting strategy probability, r(d), and
an updating rule B(d|r(d)), such that
1. For every d, xdr ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of randomizing among r(d) ∈ [0, L,H].
2. For every d, r(d) maximizes the individuals expected utility, U(r,d), for r(d)
∈ [0, L,H].
3. For every r, a(r) minimizes investigation costs, c(a), and maximizes the amount
of remediated damage E[d—r(d)] given the posterior beliefs, B(d|r(d)).
4. For every equilibrium report, r, B(d|r(d)) is the Bayes posterior for the prior
p(d) given the reporting strategy r(d).
An equilibrium of this game requires that there is cost minimization at the point
where the marginal cost of investigation is equal to the expected damage. If the
expected damage exceeds the marginal cost of investigation, the authority will audit
with probability one and the individual will issue a truthful report. Conversely, if
the expected damage is lower the than marginal cost of investigation the author-
ity does not audit and the individual sends a low report, increasing the amount of
misreporting. When the marginal costs equals the expected damage the author-
ity audits probabilistically and changes in the audit probabilities generate different
reporting strategies from the individual, which implies that an equilibrium audit
probability must provide the correct incentives in order to induce the desired re-
porting behaviour from the individual.
Before characterizing the equilibrium of the game it is important to remark that
the assumption of no ex-ante commitment to an audit is crucial for the results. This
is because, as explained by Chatterjee et al. (2008), if there is ex-ante commitment
to investigate the authority could design a policy in an exogenous manner such
that she induces a truthful report. In this sense, the information contained in the
report no longer plays an important role in determining auditing probabilities and
consequently, the equilibrium of the game.
3 Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Optimal investigation and truth telling
In the setting described in Section 2, it is clear that the minimization problem of
the authority has two main objectives. More precisely, from Item 3 in Definition
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1, the first objective for the authority is to minimize the cost of performing an in-
vestigation. At the same time the second objective is to maximize the amount of
damage that is remediated. In order to do so, he chooses the optimal probability
to audit after observing the information of the individual’s report.
Formally, these objectives are captured by Item 3 of Definition 1, so following
from that statement the optimal probability solves for
min
a(r)
c(a(r)) + (1− a(r))[B(d = L|r(d))× L+B(d = H|r(d))×H], (6)
and minimizes the expected loss of performing a costly investigation. The first-
order condition for the optimal audit probability is
ca(r) = [B(d = L|r(d))× L+B(d = H|r(d))×H]. (7)
The left-hand side term of the previous equation is the marginal cost of perform-
ing an audit and the term on the right-hand side is the marginal gain of preventing
a harmful act. As explained previously, at the optimum the marginal gain of per-
forming an audit is equal to the marginal cost. The optimal a(r) is increasing in
the posterior beliefs and decreasing in the investigation costs.
The general formulation for the equilibrium condition expressed in (7) changes
with the different strategies that the individual is able to choose. In particular,
given the strategy space of the report, r(d) ∈ [0, L,H], and considering that we
allow for the individual to randomize across his pure reporting strategies there are
many possible reporting strategies that could be candidates for an equilibrium2. It
is important to note that these possible equilibria consider that in an equilibrium
the no damage type will always report truthfully. This comes from the fact that for
the no damage type there is no incentive to deviate from r(0) = 0, because issuing
any other report will make him incur a loss of F > 0 if he is audited.
It follows that the possible equilibrium reporting strategies include the no dam-
age type reporting always r(0) = 0 and the L and H types reporting either 0, L or H
as a pure strategy, a mix across all three pure strategies (i.e. r(d = L,H) = 0LH
or a mix between two different strategies3.
2Specifically there are forty nine possible cases of reporting strategies that could be an equilibrium.
3This mixing across two different strategies includes the following possible combinations: his type
and 0, his type and the other’s type, and, the other’s type and 0.
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At this point it is worthwhile to make an assumption about the out of equilibrium
reports: whenever the authority observes a report of a pure strategy that is not
played in equilibrium she will err on the side of caution and investigate with the
highest possible audit probability in order minimize any unrepaired damage (e.g.
if no one plays r(d)=H in equilibrium and the authority observes such report, she
will believe she is facing the high damage type with certainty and she will audit,
according to (7), with probability a(H) = Hc )
4. Moreover, it is also important
to mention that the Intuitive Criterion refinement, introduced by Cho and Kreps
(1987) will be technique to address off equilibrium outcomes.
Additionally, when analyzing the equilibria of this game it is important to take
into account the nature of the reporting strategies, which might be pooling (i.e. the
individual reports the same value for different values of d) or separating (i.e. the
individual issues a different report for different values of d). Separating strategies
are always more informative than pooling strategies, in the sense that the authority
is able to track from which type of individual the report is coming. Therefore, the
authority will always try to induce this kind of report from the individual via the
audit probability.
Finding the equilibrium of this game involves checking if the right incentives are
in place for the individual to issue any of the possible reports. Particularly, the
individual will report the true level of damage when
a(r = d)d ≤ a(r $= d)(d+ F ), (8)
which is the incentive condition for the individual not to deviate and report any
other possible strategy. The left-hand side of the previous inequality is the expected
payoff when the individual is audited and has reported truthfully and the right-hand
side of the inequality is the expected payoff when the individual is audited and has
misreported. When condition (8) holds with strict inequality the individual prefers
to report truthfully rather than misreporting, and when it holds with equality the
individual is indifferent between reporting truthfully and misreporting his type, so
he is willing to randomize between reporting its true value and one of the other
possible reporting strategies. For the individual to mix between two untruthful re-
ports the probability of auditing those reports must be equal.
Finally, it is important to remark that for any mixed reporting strategy, the
audit probability of the strategy that is not played should be greater than the re-
4This argument is a reasonable one since it is always better for the authority to assume the worst
possible scenario in order to minimize expected damage.
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porting strategies that are played with positive probability. The previous ensures
that the individual does not deviate from reporting the chosen mixed strategy.
After analyzing the possible equilibrium reporting strategies, six of them satisfy
condition (8) for all possible deviations. It is possible to identify the equilibrium of
this game as a function of α and F.
In particular it will be useful to describe the equilibria of this game around a
threshold value of α. Let α¯ denote the value such that the ex-ante expected damage
is equal to L, that is
α =
L
hH + (1− h)L
≡ α¯ (9)
This critical α is a ratio between the low level of damage and, what can be
interpreted as, the expected level of high damage (recall that h is the probability
that a high level of damage occurs). In the following sub-sections we characterize
the equilibrium behaviour for two main cases, when the value of α is lower than α¯,
and when the value of α is lower than α¯.
3.2 Self-reporting with low expected damage
When the individual faces a very low probability of causing damage (α lower than α¯
α) four different reporting strategies are possible in equilibrium: {r(0) = 0, r(L) =
0, r(H) = 0}, {r(0) = 0, r(L) = 0L, r(H) = 0}, {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0},
{r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H}. Choosing one of these reporting strategies de-
pends on the values that F can take.
When the individual faces such values of α as well as very low values of F the
individual plays a pooling strategy at the lowest type. For this to be an equilibrium
reporting strategy for the individual it must be the case that the probability that
the authority performs an audit after observing a r(d) = 0 is strictly smaller than
the audit probabilities he faces after issuing a r(d) = L or r(d) = H report.
In particular, for the individual not to deviate from playing this strategy the
following conditions must be satisfied
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a(0)
a(L)
<
L
L+ F
(10)
a(0)
a(H)
<
H
H + F
, (11)
which are sufficient to ensure that the individual will not play any other possible
strategy in a situation where the probability of causing damage is low and the fine
is low.
The authority, after observing the information conveyed in the report will choose
the optimal audit probability as specified by (7). Specifically, the optimal audit
probability after observing a r(d) = 0 report is denoted by
a∗(0) =
(h(H − L) + L)α
c
, (12)
which is increasing in α. This means that as the probability of causing damage
decreases, the probability of being audited after a r(d) = 0 report also decreases.
This establishes that the optimal audit probability after observing a r(d) = 0 report
must be sufficiently low such that the incentives of the individual to issue such a
report will not be contradicted and this is true as F gets closer to 0.
As F increases the L type and the H type choose to issue different reports. In
particular, in this situation the L type decides to start revealing his type and issue a
r(H) = 0L while the H issues a r(H) = 0 report regardless of the change of strategy
of the L type individual. Similar to the previous case in which the three types of
individuals play the same strategy, this equilibrium also requires that the audit
probability after observing a r(d) = 0 is strictly smaller than the audit probabilities
he faces after issuing a r(d) = L or r(d) = H report. Specifically, the following
conditions must hold
a(0)
a(L)
=
L
L+ F
(13)
a(0)
a(H)
<
H
H + F
, (14)
which are sufficient for the L type and the H type not to deviate to any other
possible strategy.
As in the previous case, the authority chooses the optimal probability after ob-
serving the different reports. In particular, the optimal probabilities after observing
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a r(d) = 0 and a r(d) = L report should satisfy
a∗(0) =
(L+ h(H + L(−1 + xLL))− Lx
L
L)α
c+ c(−1 + h)xLLα
(15)
a∗(L) =
L
c
. (16)
As it can be observed from (51) the optimal investigation probability after a
r(d) = 0 report is issued reflects the fact that the L type individual is reporting
probabilistically. Specifically, the mixing probability that satisfies the incentives of
the individual in this case is given by
xLL =
L2 − (F + L)(h(H − L) + L)α
F (−1 + h)Lα
, (17)
which takes the value of zero when F is given by
F =
L2 − hHLα− L2α(1− h)
(hH + L− hL)α
≡ F˜ . (18)
For values of F equal to or smaller than the previous, the L type will never
issue a r(L) = L report and will submit a r(L) = 0 report with probability one.
Conversely, (54) takes the value of one when F is given by
F =
L(L− hHα− Lα+ hLα)
hHα
≡
!
F. (19)
For values of F greater than or equal to the previous, the L type will never issue
a r(L) = 0 report.
Furthermore, for the H type, given a very low probability that a damage occurs,
the punishment is not yet high enough to deter him from issuing an untruthful
report. Given the previous situation, he will be worse off by reporting his type if
the damage he committed was very high considering that the probability of being
audited after reporting truthfully is the highest possible.
When F is higher than
!
F , the equilibrium reporting strategy is given by {r(0) =
0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0}. In this case, the level of punishment for misreporting is
high enough that the L type chooses to report truthfully. However, this is not the
case for the H type, who regardless of the value of F, issues a r(H) = 0 report.
The conditions for this situation to be an equilibrium are the following
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a(0)
a(L)
>
L
L+ F
(20)
a(0)
a(H)
<
H
H + F
, (21)
which are sufficient for the H type and the L type not to deviate to other pos-
sible strategies.
Given this reporting strategy, the authority’s optimal audit probabilities after
observing a r(d) = 0 and a r(d) = L reports are should are given by
a∗(0) =
hHα
c(1− α+ hα)
(22)
a∗(L) =
L
c
, (23)
which must induce the L and the H type to report the given equilibrium strat-
egy. At this point the punishment for misreporting is high enough to deter the L
type from reporting untruthfully, however, is not yet high enough to induce the H
type to reveal information about the true value of damage he has committed.
There is only one situation in which the H type will consider revealing the true
value of the damage and is such that the punishment for misreporting is so high
that he will choose to report truthfully in a probabilistic way. More precisely, this
equilibrium is given by {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H}. For the latter to be an
equilibrium strategy it is sufficient to satisfy the following
a(0)
a(L)
>
L
L+ F
(24)
a(L)
a(H)
=
H
H + F
. (25)
The authority chooses the optimal probabilities after observing three different
possible messages. In particular, the optimal audit probabilities should satisfy
a∗(0) =
hH(1 − xHH)α
c(1− α+ h(1− xHH)α)
(26)
a∗(L) =
L
c
(27)
a∗(H) =
H
c
. (28)
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It is possible to observe that for small values of α the optimal audit probability
after observing a r(0) = 0 report is very low, which means that it is not likely
that he is investigated if he misreports. However, if regardless the value of α, an
investigation does occur, the value of the fine should be high enough to consider the
possibility of sending a truthful report.
This fact is reflected in (26) by the mixing probability denoted by xHH . In par-
ticular, the value for xHH which satisfies the sufficient conditions for an equilibrium
is given by
xHH =
Fhα+Hα−H
Fhα
, (29)
which becomes zero when the value of F is given by
F =
H(1− α)
hα
≡ Fˆ . (30)
Given low values of alpha (but strictly greater than zero), any value of F smaller
than ≡ Fˆ will induce the H type to report r(H) = 0 with probability one. More-
over, it is interesting to see that for high values of α (but strictly less than one) the
mixing probability is also positive, however the value of the fine decreases.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, if α < α¯, the H type will never report his type with
probability one at any F > 0. Moreover, as the value of F increases the L’s type
reporting strategies reveal more information about the true value of the committed
damage (d).
The result of Lemma 1 is located at the left-hand side of Figure 1. This figure
illustrates the equilibria of the entire game. It can be observed that the equilibrium
of this game is divided into two regions around the threshold value of α. For small
values of α we face the situation summarized by Lemma 1.
3.3 Self-reporting with high expected damage
The previous subsection summarizes all the possible equilibrium strategies when
the probability that the individual commits damage is very low. This subsection
describes the equilibrium when the expected damage is v high (i.e. α is greater
than α¯). From Figure 1 is possible to observe that for high values of α, the H type
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Figure 1: The equilibrium of the game as a function of α and F.
behaviour changes issuing r(H) = 0 reports to start mixing between the three dif-
ferent strategies and the L always reports his type.
In particular, when α is greater than α¯, the individual will choose to report
among the following three strategies: {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H}, {r(0) =
0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0LH} and {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0L}. As it can be
observed from Figure 1, in equilibrium, the individual will choose a certain strategy
according to the level of punishment for misreporting he could face.
As already mentioned in the previous subsection, the reporting strategy given
by {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H}, constitutes an equilibrium for both low and
high values of α.
In presence of a high expected damage it is possible to observe that the mixing
probability denoted by (81) approaches to the unity as the value of α increases. It
is interesting to note that for this particular reporting strategy there is negative
relation between α and F. When α takes low values, the punishment is sufficiently
high such that induces the H type to consider report his type.
Conversely, in the case when α is very high it is not necessary for the authority to
set such a high value of F, because the authority will audit any report with a high a
probability, as it can be observed from (26),(27), (27). In particular, when α is high,
the H will consider to report his type probabilistically until F is equal to Fˆ . For the
L type is always better to report truthfully at any value of F, given high values of α.
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Moreover, when F takes values greater than Fˆ the individual can also choose the
following strategy {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0LH}. For this reporting strategy
to be an equilibrium it must satisfy the following conditions
a(L)
a(H)
=
H
H + F
(31)
a(L) = a(0), (32)
which are sufficient for the individual not to deviate from the equilibrium.
The authority chooses the optimal audit probabilities after observing three dif-
ferent messages, which must satisfy the following
a∗(0) =
αhH(1 − xHH − x
H
L )
c(1− α+ h(1− xHH − x
H
L )α)
(33)
a∗(L) = a(L) =
L− hL+ hHxHL
c(1− h+ hxHL )
(34)
a∗(H) =
H
c
. (35)
As it can be observed from the previous expressions, the optimal audit proba-
bilities are a function of the mixing probabilities for the individual. These mixing
probabilities are such that the incentive conditions for the individual are satisfied.
In particular these probabilities look as follows
xHL =
(h− 1)
(
L(F +H)−H2
)
hFH
(36)
xHH =
(F +H)(h(H − L) + L)α−H2
αhFH
. (37)
From the previous mixing probabilities it is possible to obtain the critical value
of F such that the H type does not issue a r(L) = L probabilistically. This value
of F is denoted by
F =
H(H − L)
L
≡ F¯ , (38)
which the highest possible value at where the individual is willing to report
probabilistically among the three possible strategies. Then, for every F ∈ (Fˆ ,≡ F¯ )
the H type will mix between reporting zero damage, low damage and high damage.
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Given this strategy of the H type, the L type always report truthfully when he faces
high values of α.
Furthermore, when the value of F is smaller than Fˆ , the L type still prefers
to report truthfully but the H type will stop considering reporting his type with
some positive probability. Formally this reporting strategy is captured by {r(0) =
0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0L}. The conditions for this to be an equilibrium are
a(L)
a(H)
=
H
H + F
(39)
a(L) = a(0) (40)
After a report the authority chooses the optimal investigation probabilities which
must satisfy
a∗(0) =
hH
(
1− xHL
)
α
c
(
1− α+ h
(
1− xHL
)
α
) (41)
a∗(L) =
L− hL+ hHxHL
c(1− h+ hxHL )
, (42)
which capture the fact that the H type individual is willing to mix between
reporting no damage and reporting truthfully. In particular, the H type will to
report in such way when the mixing probability looks as follows
xHL =
(h− 1)(L− hHα− Lα+ hLα)
h(H − hHα− Lαh+ Lα)
, (43)
which becomes zero when F is given by Fˆ , which is always smaller than F¯ ,
when α is greater than α¯.
Therefore, for values of α greater than α¯. and values of F ∈ [0, Fˆ ) the L type will
play his type with probability one and the H type will randomize between r(L) = 0
and r(L) = 0 reports. When the expected damage is high, the L type prefers to
report truthfully because the probability of investigation is high enough that if he
is discovered misreporting he will have to repair the committed damage plus a fine,
which is not profitable for him, given that the true value of the committed harm is
a low one. In particular, the optimal audit probability after observing a r(d) = 0
report looks as follows
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a∗(L) =
(h (H − L) + L)α
c
, (44)
which is strictly increasing in the prior probability of committing a damage and
equal to the audit probability after observing a r(d) = 0 report, as required by the
incentive conditions of the individual.
For the H type, the fine is so low such that he is not induced to reveal his type
with any positive probability. He will rather report any of the other two possible
strategies expecting that the audit probability is not high enough such that he is
investigated and has to pay the true value of the damage plus the fine.
The previous results are formally summarized by the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, if α > α¯ , the L type will always report truthfully at
any F > 0 and the H type will never report his type with probability one.
Lemma 2 describes the right-hand side area of Figure 1. For the L type the
prior probability of committing a harm to society is so high that is not worth for
him being discovered after issuing an untruthful report. Moreover, it is important
to notice that for the case when α is high enough, the H type never plays a pure
strategy in equilibrium. For him, the damage he has committed is high enough that
he has an clear incentive to play less informative strategies, as the fine is not yet a
deterrent for misreporting.
3.4 Summary
Together Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 describe the entire equilibrium of this game, which
is unique at the given the audit probabilities. It is interesting to remark that the
equilibrium of this game involves the H type never reporting truthfully, given the
strategies of the other types, even when the level of punishment for lying is high.
Contrary to this, the L type will always report truthfully when the level the prob-
ability of committing damage if sufficiently high or the level of punishment is high
enough to deter him from issuing an untruthful report.
Furthermore, when we are located at the area of Figure 1 described by Lemma
1 (including the case when the H type reports r(H) = 0H) we know that the au-
dit probability after a r(d) = H report is the highest possible, so it follows that
when α is smaller than α > α¯ audit probabilities must satisfy a(H) > a(L) > a(0).
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When are located at the area described by Lemma 2, audit probabilities satisfy
a(H) > a(L) = a(0). The previous results can be summarized as follows
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium, given all parameter values, in
which: 1) If the ex-ante expected damage is sufficiently low ( α < α¯), a low dam-
age type individual will report truthfully if the punishment for misreporting is high
enough and a high damage type individual will never report the true value of the
damage with probability one, regardless of the level of punishment he might face if
audited. 2) If the ex-ante expected damage is sufficiently high (α > α¯), a low dam-
age type individual will always report truthfully and a high damage type individual
will never fully reveal his type.
Proposition 1 fully describes the equilibrium of this game. Holding all other
parameter values constant, a significant increase in the sanction when ( α < α¯)
induces the L type to report truthfully, however for the H type the previous is not
the case. For him, the probability of being audited after sending a r(H) = H is so
high that he will always prefer not to fully reveal his type, given that α is low. In
other words, even under a significant increase in the fine, if it is very unlikely that
damage happens, the H type will prefer to lie in order to perceive a higher payoff
(i.e. repair a smaller value of damage and not receive a fine) than he will face if he
would have reported truthfully.
In contrast, when ( α > α¯), holding all parameter values constant, a significant
increase in the sanction does not have an effect on the L type reporting strategies
as he will report truthfully regardless the value of the sanction. This means that,
when it is very likely that damage occurs, the L type is always better off by revealing
the true value of the damage and not paying a fine. In this case the value of the
damage must be low enough such that is not worth for him to submit an untruthful
report. As for the H type, as F increases, he considers to reveal the true value
of the damage, however is not high enough to make him report truthfully with
probability one.
4 Welfare analysis
As described in Section 1, literature argues that self-reporting programs can increase
welfare because they allow the authority to save on costly investigations and use
these resources on other activities that would benefit society. However, this is not
always the case when the assumption of truthful self-reporting is relaxed as it is
done in this setting.
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Moreover, it is worth to recall that in the standard self-reporting set up the au-
thority uses the sanction as an incentive for violators to self-report. In this sense,
the authority will reward individuals who self-report their harmful acts with a lower
sanction; the more self-reporting the less investigation costs are invested in detect-
ing violators and, therefore, society welfare increases. Contrary to that, in this set
up the sanction acts as a deterrent for misreporting because the individual can lie
about the true value of the damage and, consequently, generate a cost to society be-
cause some damage will remain unrepaired. It can be argued that a lower fine does
not necessarily increase society’s welfare when self-reporters do not report truthfully.
From (5) we know that ex-post, the authority has minimized the expected costs
of an investigation regardless if he faces a truthful or untruthful report. Ex-ante,
the optimal investigation probability is the one that induces the individual to re-
port truthfully. In particular, the ex-ante welfare function looks like the following
expression
W (a) = −[(1− α) c(a) + α (1− h) (c(a) + (1− a)L) + αh (c(a) + (1− a)H)]
(45)
Which is increasing in the audit probabilities and decreasing in the cost of in-
vestigation. The previous equation tells us that, ex-ante, the authority assess the
potential unrepaired damage, given the audit probabilities in order to maximize
social welfare (or minimize the loss of resources that could be used in other forms
of spending).
The different reporting equilibrium strategies generate different effects on social
welfare. In particular, welfare follows a different pattern for those strategies who
are located at the left-hand side of the critical α and those located at the right-hand
side of such value of α.
When (α < α¯) , welfare never increases as the value of the fine increases. Specif-
ically, when {r(0) = 0, r(L) = 0, r(H) = 0} and {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0}
are played in equilibrium, welfare is independent of the value of F. When {r(0) =
0, r(L) = 0L, r(H) = 0} is played in equilibrium, welfare is decreasing in the value
of F. In this case, as α is very low, it is unlikely that any damage occurs so the role
of the fine as a deterrent for misreporting is very limited. This analysis does not
apply for the case where the H type mixes between r(H) = 0 and r(H) = H in
equilibrium, in which welfare is increasing in the value of the fine.
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Contrary to the previous result, for those strategies at the right-hand side area
of Figure 1, increasing the value of the fine increases welfare as the individual
chooses between equilibrium reporting strategies {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0L},
{r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0LH} and {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H}. Partic-
ularly, when {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0L} is played in equilibrium, welfare is
independent of the level of F and when he plays {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0LH}
and {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H}, welfare is increasing in F.
The latter is the most interesting case, in the sense that when α is sufficiently
high, it is possible to see the changes in welfare at the points of F where the indi-
vidual changes of reporting strategy. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
0, , 0L L 0, , 0L LH 0, , 0L H
W
F
Fˆ F
Figure 2: Social welfare when expected damage is high.
From the previous graph it can be observed the changes of the welfare func-
tion as the values of F increase. Clearly there the welfare function evaluated at
the points where the individual plays {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0LH} and
{r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H} are upward sloping. In addition, it is also in-
teresting to note that for values of F greater than F¯ there is a downward jump in
welfare, so welfare is maximized when F is equal to F¯ .
This implies that for values of F greater than F¯ the deterrent effect of the
punishment diminishes (because at this point the H type starts revealing more in-
formation about the true value of the damage) but is still effective enough such that
it is always welfare enhancing.
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The previous results are summarized in Proposition 2
Proposition 2. In a self-reporting scheme where individuals not always report
truthfully, if α > α¯ social welfare is maximized at a finite value of F.
The result stated in Proposition 2 confirms the argument discussed in the ini-
tial paragraphs of this section. When the self-reporting mechanism assumes that
violators will report truthfully, lowering the sanction always increases welfare be-
cause it acts as an incentive for the individual to report his crime. Contrary to this,
when the self-reporters do not report truthfully, increasing the sanction increases
welfare provided the expected damage is sufficiently high (α > α¯). Moreover, wel-
fare is maximized at a certain value of F, which means that if the authority chooses
a value for the fine greater than the previous she will not be achieving her objectives.
5 Conclusions
Self-reporting programs have become an important tool in law enforcement in many
fields because they offer several advantages over regimes without self-reporting, such
as reducing enforcement costs, improvement of risk sharing, among others. These
advantages always translate into greater social welfare because authorities can re-
direct resources to other forms of productive spending that may benefit society.
However, these results hold under several assumptions on the optimal design of
the mechanism. This thesis analyzes self-reporting in situations where the author-
ity faces self-reporters that may not report truthfully. Moreover, the design of the
self-reporting mechanism considers that individuals who self-report must repair the
damage they have committed and a sanction if the authority discovers they have
misreported.
Two main conclusions arise. First, when the authority faces individuals who
may self-report falsely, the optimal design of self-reporting programs should include
some level of deterrence in order obtain information about the true harm that has
been committed. In other words, if the authority does not know if she is facing
a truth telling self reporter, the self reporting program must be designed in way
such that induces violators to report the true value of damage they have caused.
As it has been observed, raising the level of deterrence provides an incentive for
individual to reveal more information which allows the authority to identify who
are false reporters and who are truth tellers. Two different cases were addressed,
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given parameter values. In particular when the expected damage is low, those who
commit low damage are induced to reveal its true value as the fine is sufficiently
high. When expected damage is high and the sanction for not reporting truthfully
is sufficiently large even those who have committed high damage consider reporting
truthfully, given the high costs they will face if they decide to misreport.
The fact that the violators may not report truthfully raises the question if self-
reporting programs always have a positive effect on social welfare. The second main
conclusion is that self-reporting programs increase welfare as long as violators are
induced to report truthfully. This is because truthful reporting will ensure that
repaired damage is maximized and spending in costly investigations is minimized.
In particular it was observed that social welfare and the punishment for misreport-
ing have a positive relation increases as deterrence becomes stronger (i.e. the fine
increases) when expected damage is sufficiently high. Moreover, there exists an op-
timal value of a fine such that violators consider to issue truthful reports even when
they face high costs of remediation.
Overall, this thesis provides insights for the design of self-reporting mechanisms
in the context of law enforcement. The efficiency of a self-reporting program de-
pends on whether violators are willing to report truthfully or not. As discussed pre-
viously, the likelihood of reporting truthfully depends on the level of harm/damage
that the individual causes to society and the punishment that he faces if he does not
report truthfully. When there is no certainty that violators will report truthfully, is
better maintain certain level of deterrence because this ensures there are incentives
for the individual to reveal more information about his crime. However, in situa-
tions where major violations of the law may arise is better to rely on deterrence
and common investigation procedures. It is clear then that when self-reporters are
not always truth tellers and when remediation costs are in place, the results from
the standard self-reporting set up no longer hold. This may have implications for
future policy design as for future research on these matters.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Recall from the text
α¯ ≡
L
hH + (1− h)L
(46)
1. Consider the reporting strategy given by {r(0) = 0, r(L) = 0L, r(H) = 0}.
For this strategy to be an equilibrium the following necessary conditions must
be satisfied
a(L)
a(0)
=
L+ F
L
(47)
a(H) > a(0) (48)
a(0)
a(H)
=
H
H + F
(49)
a(L) > a(0). (50)
Where (47) and (48) are the conditions for the L type to mix between L and
0, and (49) and (50) are the conditions for H to play 0.
Recall from the text, the first order conditions of the authority
a(0) =
(L+ h(H + L(−1 + xLL))− Lx
L
L)α
c+ c(−1 + h)xLLα
(51)
a(L) =
L
c
(52)
a(H) =
H
c
. (53)
From the binding condition (47) we solve for xLL and obtain the following
expression
xLL =
L2 − (F + L)(h(H − L) + L)α
F (−1 + h)Lα
. (54)
Which is ∈ [0, 1] when α < α¯.
Setting (54) equal to zero and solving for F yields
F =
L2 − hHLα− L2α(1− h)
(hH + L− hL)α
≡ F˜ (55)
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This expression is always greater than 0 when α < α¯. The value of F obtained
in (55) is the lowest possible value that will induce the L type to mix between
0 and L; i.e. the lower bound. For values of F smaller than F˜ , the L type
will never play L as a pure strategy.
Setting (54) equal to one and solving for F yields
F =
L(L− hHα− Lα+ hLα)
hHα
≡
!
F, (56)
which is always greater than 0 when α < α¯. The value of F obtained in (56)
is the upper bound of the values that will induce the L type to mix between 0
and L. For values of F greater than
!
F , the L type will play L as a pure strategy.
Therefore, when the value of F falls between the lower and upper bounds, as
established in (55) and (56), the L type will play L with positive probability.
For the H type to play his type we know that (49) and (50) must hold.
Substituting the value of (54) into (51) obtains
a(0) =
L2
cF + cL
. (57)
This result satisfies (49) at any F > 0. Moreover, (57) satisfies (50) for any
value of F > 0. Therefore, H plays 0 at any F > 0.
If condition (50) is satisfied then condition (47) is also satisfied, similarly, if
condition (49) is satisfied then (48) is satisfied. Therefore, for values of F be-
tween (55) and (56), the L type mixes between 0 and L and the H type plays 0.
2. Consider the reporting strategy given by {r(0) = 0, r(L) = 0, r(H) = 0}. The
necessary conditions for this strategy to be an equilibrium are
a(0)
a(L)
<
L
L+ F
(58)
a(H) > a(0) (59)
a(0)
a(H)
<
H
H + F
(60)
a(L) > a(0), (61)
27
where (58) and (59) are the conditions for the L type to report 0 , and (60)
and (61) are the conditions for H type to report 0.
The first order condition of the authority are
a(0) =
(h (H − L) + L)α
c
(62)
a(L) =
L
c
(63)
a(H) =
H
c
. (64)
For the H type to play his type in equilibrium it is enough to check that (58)
is satisfied as this will also satisfy (60). So we need to show that when we
substitute (62) into (59) this condition still hold.
We know from the first part of this proof that for the L type not to deviate,
the value of F has to be lower than F˜ . Substituting such value of F into (58)
we can see that the R.H.S of the inequality becomes equal to value of a(0)
given by (62). We also know that for any F greater than F˜ , the L type starts
playing his type, so this inequality must hold for any F greater than zero and
smaller than F˜ .
Moreover, (61) is always satisfied for values of α < α¯.
Therefore, the H type will play 0 in equilibrium when α < α¯ and F greater
than zero and smaller than F˜ .
As for the L type condition (59) holds and (60) implies (58), therefore the L
type will also play 0 in equilibrium when α < α¯ and F greater than zero and
smaller than F˜ .
3. Finally, consider the equilibrium reporting strategy given by r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0.
The necessary conditions for this strategy to be an equilibrium are
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a(H)
a(L)
<
L
L+ F
(65)
a(0)
a(L)
<
L
L+ F
(66)
a(0)
a(H)
=>
H
H + F
(67)
a(L) > a(0), (68)
where (65) and (66) are the conditions for the L type to report truthfully, and
(67) and (68) are the conditions for H type to issue a 0 report.
Recall from the text, the first order condition of the authority
a(0) =
hHα
c(1− α+ hα)
(69)
a(L) =
L
c
(70)
a(H) =
H
c
. (71)
For the L type to play L as a pure strategy in equilibrium, we have to check
that both (66) and (65) hold.
We know from the first part of the proof that when F is greater than
!
F the L
type reports truthfully. Substituting (69) and
!
F into (66) we find that both
sides of the inequality become equal, implying that it must be the case that
the value of F that satisfies (66) is greater than
!
F .
For such values of F condition (65) always holds for any α < 1 and conse-
quently, for any α < α¯.
For the H type to play 0, we have to check that both (67) and (68) hold.
Given the L type plays his type, substituting (69) and
!
F into condition (67)
yields the following expression for the R.H.S of the inequality
hH3α
c (hH2α− hHLα+ L2(1 + (−1 + h)α))
. (72)
Which when evaluated at α = L
hH+(1−h)L , becomes
H
c . Suppose that α = 1,
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then the L.H.S of (67) is also H
c
. Then, it must be the case that when α < α¯
the L.H.S of (67) decreases and the R.H.S increases, which means (67) holds
for values of α < α¯, and F greater than .
Moreover, condition (68) always holds for α < α¯. Therefore, the H type will
play 0 when F is greater than (56) and α < α¯.
4. The three previous parts of proof have established that the H type reports 0
at any F > 0 and α < α¯.
Also, at any α < α¯, for values of F ∈ [0, F˜ ] the L type will report 0. For
values of F between F˜ and
!
F he will mix between 0 and L.
For values of F greater than
!
F the L type will report his type with probability
one.
Therefore, if α < α¯ and F > 0 the H type will never report his type with
probability one, and the L type will reveal his type as F increases. Q.E.D.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Recall from the text
α¯ ≡
L
hH + (1− h)L
(73)
1. Consider the reporting strategy given by {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H}.
The necessary conditions for this strategy to be an equilibrium are
a(0)
a(L)
>
L
L+ F
(74)
a(H)
a(L)
>
L
L+ F
(75)
a(L)
a(H)
=
H
H + F
(76)
a(L) > a(0). (77)
Recalling from the text, the first order conditions of the authority
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a(0) =
hH(1− xHH)α
c(1 − α+ h(1 − xHH)α)
(78)
a(L) =
L
c
(79)
a(H) =
H
c
. (80)
Substituting the values of a(0) and a(H) into condition (76) and solving for
the mixing probability yields
xHH =
Fhα+Hα−H
Fhα
, (81)
which is positive for values of α > L
hH+(1−h)L . Setting (81) to zero and solving
for F yields
F =
H(1− α)
hα
≡ Fˆ (82)
At this point the H type does not play his type in equilibrium. Consequently,
for any F greater than Fˆ and α > α¯ (and strictly less than the unity), the
expression (81) is positive.
If we substitute the previous mixing probability into (78) we obtain
a(0) =
H2
c(F +H)
, (83)
which immediately satisfies condition (76). For the H type to play 0H we
also need to check that the inequality condition expressed in (77) is satisfied.
It is possible to observe that (83) is decreasing in F. When F is equal to Fˆ
both sides of the mentioned inequality become equal, therefore, (77) holds at
any F greater than Fˆ .
For the L type to report L it can be observed that (74) is satisfied at any
F > 0. From (76) we know that a(H) > a(0) so (75) holds for any F > 0.
Therefore, for any F greater than Fˆ and α > α¯ (but strictly less than the
unity), the H type will play his type with positive probability and the L type
will always report truthfully.
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From the previous conditions, it is easy to check that the previous equilibrium
exits for values of α < α¯ but greater than zero.
2. Consider the reporting strategy given by {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0LH}.
The necessary conditions for this strategy to be an equilibrium are
a(0)
a(L)
>
L
L+ F
(84)
a(H)
a(L)
>
L
L+ F
(85)
a(L)
a(H)
=
H
H + F
(86)
a(L) = a(0), (87)
where (84) and (85) are the conditions for the L type to report truthfully,
and (86) and (87) are the conditions for the H type to mix across the three
reporting strategies.
Recall from the text, the first order conditions of the authority
a(0) =
αhH(1 − xHH − x
H
L )
c(1 − α+ h(1 − xHH − x
H
L )α)
(88)
a(L) = a(L) =
L− hL+ hHxHL
c(1− h+ hxHL )
(89)
a(H) =
H
c
. (90)
Substituting the first order conditions into (86) and (87), and solving for the
mixing probabilities yields
xHL =
(h− 1)
(
L(F +H)−H2
)
hFH
(91)
xHH =
(F +H)(h(H − L) + L)α−H2
αhFH
. (92)
Setting (91) to 0 and solving for F yields
F =
H(H − L)
L
≡ F¯ , (93)
which is the point where the H type will never play L.
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Setting (92) to 0 and solving for F yields
F =
H2 − hH2α−HLα+ hHLα
(hH + L− hL)α
(94)
,
which, when evaluated at α = L
hH+(1−h)L , is equal to F¯ .
For the L type to play L we observe that substituting (91) and (92) into (88)
and (89) respectively, we get
a(0) = a(L) =
H2
c(F +H)
, (95)
which immediately satisfies condition (87). Since, a(0) and a(L) are equal,
condition (84) holds for any F > 0. Moreover, we know that condition (86)
is satisfied at any F > 0, therefore, it must be the case that it is satisfied at
F¯ . We also know that condition (85) is implied by (86), so it is satisfied at
any F > 0.
From the first part of this proof we know that the H type will play his type
probabilistically when F is greater than F¯ . It follows then that the H type
will mix between 0, L and his type when F is greater than Fˆ but lower than
F¯ , and α > α¯. The L type will always report truthfully for the same values
of α and any F > 0.
3. Consider the reporting strategy given by {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0L}.
The necessary conditions for this strategy to be an equilibrium are
a(0)
a(L)
>
L
L+ F
(96)
a(H)
a(L)
>
L
L+ F
(97)
a(L)
a(H)
<
H
H + F
(98)
a(L) = a(0), (99)
where (96) and (97) are the conditions for the L type to report truthfully, and
(98) and (99) are the conditions for H to mix across L and 0.
Recall from the text, the first order conditions of the authority
33
a(0) =
hH
(
1− xHL
)
α
c
(
1− α+ h
(
1− xHL
)
α
) (100)
a(L) =
L− hL+ hHxHL
c(1− h+ hxHL )
(101)
a(H) =
H
c
. (102)
Substituting the first order conditions into (99) and solving for the mixing
probabilities yields
xHL =
(h− 1)(L− hHα− Lα+ hLα)
h(H − hHα− Lαh+ Lα)
(103)
Which is positive and less than unity, when α > α¯.
Substituting the previous expression into (100) and (101) yields
a(0) = a(L) =
(h (H − L) + L)α
c
. (104)
Which immediately satisfies (99). Moreover, by substituting (104) and (102)
into (98) we get the following expression
(h (H − L) + L)α
c
<
H2
c(H + F )
. (105)
Both sides of the previous inequality become equal when α = L
hH+(1−h)L and
F is equal to Fˆ . The L.H.S of the expression is increasing in α and the R.H.S
is decreasing in F, as a result, (98) holds when α > α¯ and F is smaller than
Fˆ . Therefore, the H type will play 0L in equilibrium when α > α¯ and F is
greater than zero but smaller than Fˆ .
Moreover, if (99) holds then condition (96) always holds and since (97) is im-
plied by (98), the L type will play his type, given that H will play 0L.
4. From the three previous parts of the proof we can state that the L type reports
truthfully at any F > 0 and α > α¯.
Also, at any α > α¯, for values of F ∈ [0, Fˆ ] the H type will mix between 0
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and L. For values of F ∈ (Fˆ , F¯ ), he will report a mixing between 0, L and H.
For values of F > F¯ ), the H type will mix between 0 and his type.
Therefore, if α > α¯ and F > 0 the L type always reports truthfully and the H
type will never report his type with probability one. Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the existence of the equilibrium solution of this game it is sufficient to rely
on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Then, what is left to show is the uniqueness of the
solution.
To show that the solution of this game is unique we first eliminate all the possible
equilibria which do not satisfy the incentive conditions for the individual not to
deviate from the equilibrium strategy. These are grouped by some condition that
is required for the H type to play a given strategy and then it is followed by the
contradiction which arises when the L type plays a given strategy in equilibrium.
For simplicity, the equilibrium strategies will be written in brackets, where the first
element is the strategy play by the 0 type, the second is the strategy played by the
L type and the third, by the H type. We proceed as follows
1. a(0) = a(L) is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement.
- (0, 0LH, 0L): the L type requires a(0) < a(L)
- (0, 0H, 0L): the L type requires a(0) = a(H) < a(L)
- (0, 0L, 0LH): the L type requires fraca(L)a(0) = L+FF
- (0, 0, 0L): the L type requires a(0)
a(L) =
L
L+F
2. a(0) > a(L) is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement.
- (0, 0,HL): requires a(0)
a(L) <
L
L+F for the L type
- (0, 0H,L): requires a(L)
a(H) >
L+F
L
- (0, 0, L): requires a(0)
a(L) >
L
L+F
3. a(0) < a(L) is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement.
- (0, 0L, 0L): requires a(0) = a(L) for the L type
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- (0, 0L,HL): requires a(0) > a(L) for the L type
4. a(H) > a(0) is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement.
- (0,HL,OH): requires a(0) > a(H) for the L type
5. a(H) > a(0) = a(L) is required for the H type play a given strategy in
equilibrium. The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type
incentives contradict the previous requirement.
- (0, 0LH,OLH), (0, 0LH,OH), (0, 0LH, 0), (0, 0H,OLH): require a(0) =
a(H) for the L type
- (0,HL,OL), (0,H,OL): require a(H) < a(L) for the L type
- (0, 0, 0LH): requires a(0)
a(L) <
L
L+F for the L type
- (0,H, 0LH): requires a(H)
a(L) <
L
L+F for the L type
6. a(H) > a(L) is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement.
- (0, 0LH,HL), (0, 0LH,L), (0,HL, 0LH), (0,HL,HL), (0,H,L): require
a(L) > a(H) for the L type
7. a(0)
a(H) <
H
H+F is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement.
- (0, 0H, 0): requires a(0) = a(H) for the L type
- (0,HL, 0L): requires a(0) > a(H) for the L type
8. a(0)
a(H) =
H
H+F is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement.
- (0, 0H, 0H): requires a(0) = a(L)
9. a(0)
a(H) >
H
H+F is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement
- (0, 0,H): requires a(0)
a(L) <
L
L+F
10. a(L)
a(H) <
H
H+F is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement
- (0, 0L,L), (0,HL,L) : requires a(L) > a(0)
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11. a(L)
a(H) =
H
H+F and a(0) > a(H) is required for the H type play a given strategy
in equilibrium. The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L
type incentives contradict the previous requirement
- (0, 0H, 0H): requires a(0) = a(L)
12. a(L)
a(H) =
H
H+F is required for the H type play a given strategy in equilibrium.
The following strategies cannot be equilibria, because the L type incentives
contradict the previous requirement
- (0,H, 0H): requires a(0) = a(L)
Some other possible equilibrium cannot be eliminated by contradictions of the
incentive conditions of both types of individual. It is worth to address them case
by case.
1. (0, 0LH,H) case
For this case to be an equilibrium the following conditions are sufficient
a(H) = a(0) (106)
a(L)
a(H)
=
(L+ F )
L
(107)
Recall from the text the first order condition of the authority. In this case
they look as follows,
a(0) =
(1− h)L
(
1− xLH − x
L
L
)
α
c
(
1− α+ (1− h)
(
1− xLH − x
L
L
)
α
) (108)
a(L) =
L
c
(109)
a(H) =
LxLH + h
(
H − LxLH
)
c
(
h+ xLH − hx
L
H
) (110)
Substituting (108), (109),(110) into (106) and (107) and solving for the mixing
probabilities we obtain,
xLL =
L2 − (F + L)(h(H − L) + L)α
F (−1 + h)Lα
(111)
xLH =
FhH + hHL− hL2
F (−1 + h)L
(112)
To confirm the reporting strategy is not an equilibrium it is sufficient to show
that one the previous mixing probabilities /∈ [0, 1]. It is possible to see that
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for any F > 0, (112) is always negative. Therefore (0, 0LH,H) is not an
equilibrium reporting strategy.
2. (0, 0L, 0H)case
For this case to be an equilibrium the following conditions are sufficient
a(0)
a(H)
=
(H + F )
H
(113)
a(L)
a(0)
=
(L+ F )
L
(114)
From the first order condition of the authority we know that,
a(L) =
L
c
(115)
a(H) =
H
c
(116)
Substituting (115) and (116) in (113) and (114), we obtain
a(0) =
L2
c(L+ F )
(117)
a(0) =
H2
c(H + F )
, (118)
which given parameter values, will never be equal. Therefore, this strategy is
not an equilibrium.
3. (0, L,H)
The fully separating case breaks down because, as the authority knows for sure
who is sending the message, if he observes a r(d) = 0, he will believe he faces 0
type with probability one and will audit with probability equal to zero. This
will provide and incentive to deviate for both the L and H to deviate from
reporting their types. Therefore, this strategy is not an equilibrium.
4. (0, L,HL), (O,HL,H), (0,H,H), (0, L, L) This cases can be eliminated follow-
ing with a similar argument than the fully separating one. In this cases, the
only who sends a 0 signal is the zero type, so whenever the authority observes
a r(d) = 0 report, she will believe that faces a 0 type and will investigate
with probability zero. Given this, the L and H type will have an incentive to
deviate from equilibrium.
5. (0, 0H,H)and(0, 0, 0H) To eliminate this cases we rely on Cho-Kreps Intuitive
Criterion (IC) For the first case, (0, 0H,H) we can see that the L type is better
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off by deviating from this equilibrium by reporting truthfully. As changing
the stratefy to r(L) = L is a profitable deviation only for the L type, she
will believe she faces the L type with probability one, and will audit with
probability, a(L) = L/c.
Given the previous, for the H type IC imposes a belief of zero when she
observes r(H) = H. However, the belief of facing a H type after a r(H) = H
report is given
B(H|r(H)) =
hα
hα+ (1− h)xLLα
, (119)
which is only zero when α = 0. However, when α = 0, the audit probability
after a r(d) = 0 report becomes zero, and everyone will have an incentive to
deviate from equilibrium. Therefore this strategy does not survive IC and is
not an equilibrium.
A for the (0, 0H,H) case, for the H it is always profitable to deviate from
this equilibrium and report truthfully. Such deviation is not profitable for the
L type so IC places zero probability to facing an L type and probability one
on facing a H type. We know by assumption, that in this case the belief of
facing an L type is one, so the system of beliefs of the game contradicts the
ones imposed by IC. Therefore this strategy does not survive the IC.
With this last to reporting strategies we have ruled all the possible cases by
the unique solution presented in the text. Q.E.D.
D Proof of Proposition 2
We want to show that that welfare is maximized at a finite F when α > α¯ Given
the following welfare function for {r(0) = 0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0LH} and {r(0) =
0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H} reporting strategies
W0,L,0LH =
−H3 + (−2c(F +H) +H(F + 2H))(h(H − L) + L)α
2c(F +H)
(120)
W0,L,0H =
−H3 +
(
H2(H + h(F +H))− (−1 + h)(F +H)L2 − 2c(F +H)(h(H − L) + L)
)
α
2c(F +H)
,
(121)
When they are evaluated at F¯ , both functions become equal. We know from
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Lemma 2 that for values greater than F¯ , the individual will always plays {r(0) =
0, r(L) = L, r(H) = 0H}. Therefore, to show that welfare is maximized at α¯ we
need to show that for any value of alpha W0,L,0H is lower than W0,L,0LH .
Taking the limit of (120) when F goes to infinity, we obtain
−
(2c−H) (h (H − L) + L)α
2c
. (122)
Taking the limit of (121) when F goes to infinity, we obtain
(
L2 − 2c (h (H − L) + L) + h
(
H2 − L2
))
α
2c
(123)
Subtracting (123) from (122) yields
(1− h) (H − L)Lα
2c
, (124)
which is always positive. Therefore, any other value of F greater that F¯ cannot
maximize welfare as W0,L,0H is always smaller for any F greater than F¯ . Q.E.D
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